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ASSET FORFEITURE: STATE RESTRICTIONS AND EQUITABLE SHARING
By
Charles Kucher
University of New Hampshire, December, 2010
Civil asset forfeiture is criticized for its lack of procedural protections for property
owners and for skewing the priorities of law enforcement. Federal civil forfeiture law
allows federal agencies to prosecute civil forfeiture cases for state and local law
enforcement agencies, a practice that is criticized for allowing the circumvention of state
laws. This thesis looks at three factors governing forfeiture at the state level (standard of
proof, conviction requirement and financial incentive) and examines their effect on
federal equitable sharing payments. The results indicate that both conviction requirement
and standard of proof affect equitable sharing payments and suggests that state procedural
protections are being circumvented through the use of federal courts. Federal law can be
changed to discourage this by requiring convictions in state court and limiting adoptions
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INTRODUCTION
On June 30 of 2009, the ACLU filed a lawsuit against police in Tenaha, Texas
alleging that black motorists were targeted in traffic stops. In their brief, they allege that
drivers were threatened with money laundering charges and were promised that
prosecution would be waived if they agreed to forfeit cash and property to the police
(ACLU 2009). The ACLU suggests that they did this "not for any legitimate law
enforcement purpose but to enrich their offices and perhaps themselves" (ACLU 2009:2).
Property was seized from roughly 140 motorists between 2006 and 2008 and charges
filed against less than half (Falkenberg 2009).
In the same month, funding for a gang task force in the St. Paul-Minneapolis area
of Minnesota was cut and the task force disbanded after allegations of misconduct. A
review panel found "appalling and outrageous" misconduct related to the task force's
seizure of property (Luger and Egelhof 2009: 14). Strike force members seized money
from suspects "regardless of any intent to file charges" and "without regard as to whether
the funds could reasonably be connected with illegal activity" (Luger and Egelhof
2009:5). The Commander of the Strike Force said that often times police would find "an
array of stuff that's really neat" and would seize and forfeit the property because the
police thought the suspect didn't deserve it (Luger and Egelhof 2009: 15).
Scandals such as these shape the context of discussion on asset forfeiture. The
practice is an anachronism in many ways. Based on "an antiquated legal fiction", it
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determines the guilt of property instead of people (Yoskowitz in Jensen and Gerber
1996:425). Developed centuries ago in the common and admiralty laws of imperial
England to allow the British crown to forfeit property used to commit crime and violate
revenue and customs laws (Gordon 1995:746), its use in America was limited until it was
resurrected by the Nixon administration and expanded by the Reagan administration as a
weapon in the War on Drugs (Jensen and Gerber 1996:422-423). Despite its age, it is
currently defended by proponents as a vital weapon in the battle against illicit drugs and
other financially motivated crimes (DOJ Asset Forfeiture Program 2008:3).
Its legal pedigree and importance to law enforcement has not shielded the practice
from criticism. Empowered by its peculiar standing in the American legal system and its
development as a weapon in the ever expanding War on Drugs, the widespread use of the
power leads critics such as Marc Stahl (1992) to allege the use of civil legal proceedings
represents an unconstitutional breach of due process rights. Others argue that law
enforcements ability to profit from the practice skews their priorities and reduces
legislatures' ability to control their police departments (Blumenson and Nilsen 1998).
It is suggested that the change in incentives prompted by federal forfeiture law
has altered the environment for state and local law enforcement bureaucracies (Benson,
Rasmussen and Sollars 1995) and given them a stake in federal law (Blumenson and
Nilsen 1998:51). This last relationship bears particular scrutiny due to state and local law
enforcement's ability to bypass state courts in favor of more lenient federal courts
through federal adoption, a practice promoted by the federal government to foster
cooperation between state and federal law enforcement. It is this relationship that is the
focus of this study.
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The history of forfeiture is discussed below. The practice is traced from its roots
in England to its modern incarnation in America. The controversies that surround its use
by American law enforcement are discussed along with the concerns of critics. Finally,
the relationship between state and federal forfeiture law shall be examined with several
statistical tests. These tests will be performed to determine if state laws are bypassed in
favor of more lenient federal standards and the implications of the results shall be
discussed in light of the surrounding controversy.
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CHAPTER I
FORFEITURE IN THE UNITED STATES
Three kinds of forfeiture existed under English law when the Constitution was
written; deodand, estate and statutory. Deodand applied to property that had directly or
indirectly caused the death of one of the King's subjects and the property itself was
considered the offender. Estate forfeiture was used to deprive real and personal property
from those convicted of a felony or treason. Statutory forfeiture "applied to objects used
in violation of the customs [and] revenue laws" for example ships used to transport goods
in violation of the Navigation Act of 1660 (Gordon 1995:746).
Of these early forms of forfeiture the two most important to understanding
forfeiture's current incarnation in the United States are deodand and statutory. Under
English common law any personal property that caused the death of one of the King's
subject was declared forfeit to the Church. Property was rarely given to the Church
however, and instead the value of the animal or property that caused the death was
assessed and the sum considered a fine or forfeiture to be paid to the King (Finkelstein
1981:73). The object was referred to as a deodand and the property itself considered
guilty. Because the property was considered the guilty party, the proceeding was against
the property, or in rem, instead of being in personam against the property owner. In rem
procedures, by taking action against property instead of an individual, are predicated on
"the legal fiction that the property is 'guilty'" (Edgeworth 2008:2). The guilt or
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innocence of the owner was irrelevant to the forfeiture of the deodand (Gordon
1995:746).
Statutory forfeiture only applied to property that was used to violate revenue and
customs laws. The Navigation Act of 1660 required goods to be shipped in English
vessels and violation resulted in the forfeiture of the vessel and the goods contained in it.
The property itself was considered guilty and the proceeding was in rem against the
property. The property owner had to file a claim to contest the forfeiture and, much like
a deodand, the innocence or guilt of the owner did not matter. A ship could be forfeited
due to the action of one of the crew members despite the ship's owner or master not
knowing about the illegal activity (Gordon 1995:746-747).
United States' admiralty law contained similar provisions allowing in rem
proceedings against property and withstood an early legal challenge. In The Palmyra
decision of 1827, the court dismissed the necessity of conviction before the forfeiture of a
privateer's vessel because "the offence is attached primarily to the thing" (25 U. S. 14).
It drew distinction between estate forfeitures in the common law where the property of
felons was forfeit to the Crown after a conviction and in rem statutory forfeiture and
stated that "the proceeding in rem stands independent of and wholly unaffected by any
criminal proceeding in personam" (26 US 15).
Later, forfeiture was used during Prohibition to combat the illegal transportation
of liquor. Vehicles used to transport liquor could be forfeit at both the state and federal
levels, with state and federal law differing on the treatment of innocent owners. Innocent
owner protections were based on the wording of the particular in rem statute. The
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National Prohibition Act and several state statutes explicitly protected the rights of
innocent owners and lienors who did not know or consent to the use of the vehicles for
illegal purposes (D.L.B. 1927:660-661). Courts in states that did not have statutory
innocent owner provisions split on whether or not the innocent owner's rights should be
protected (D.L.B. 1927:662).
The Supreme Court ruling in J. W. Goldsmith Jr. -Grant Co. v. United States in
1921 held that a statute that treats the object as the offender and allows the forfeiture of
property despite the owner's innocence does not violate the Due Process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The case involved the forfeiture of a car used "in the removal and for
the deposit and concealment of 58 gallons of distilled spirits upon which a tax was
imposed by the United States" (254 U. S. 508). Congress, "by ascribing to the property a
certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong", allows property to be
tried separately from the owner, echoing the law of deodand (254 U. S. 510). The court
buttressed its decision with previous applications of in rem forfeiture in admiralty law
holding that the object was the offender (254 U. S. 511).
Five years later the court ruled that the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property
by state government did not violate the Due Process clause of the constitution. Van Oster
v. Kansas involved a plaintiffs car being used by an associate who was arrested and
charged with using the car to illegally transport liquor. Forfeiture was initiated and
upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Kansas despite the person charged with the
crime used to justify the forfeiture having been acquitted in criminal court (272 U. S.
466). The court saw no distinction between police using in rem forfeiture to control
crime and the federal government using in rem forfeiture to collect taxes and enforce
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revenue measures (272 U. S. 468). The decision left the effect of the criminal acquittal
on the forfeiture, as well as other particulars of procedure, such as jury trials and
sufficiency of evidence used in them, up to the state (272 U. S. 469). Statutory penalties
such as asset forfeiture have historically taken place in civil proceedings and though the
justification for the forfeiture ostensibly arises from a crime, in rem forfeiture takes place
wholly independent of the criminal trial in personam (Rothe 1950: 1138).
Modern use of forfeiture started in 1970 when Congress resurrected criminal in
personam forfeiture as part of the Organized Crime Control Act (Gordon 1995:748) and
civil in rem forfeiture in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Prevention Act (Jensen and
Gerber 1996:422). Forfeiture became associated primarily with the war on drugs and is
considered a "major weapon" for law enforcement (Nelson 1992:1309). The civil
forfeiture statute as written in 1970 declared controlled substances, along with all raw
materials and equipment used in their manufacture and vehicles used for their distribution
to be forfeitable (Stahl 1992:276). As implemented in 1970, Section 881 of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act set the standard of proof required for
forfeiture in federal civil in rem proceedings at probable cause and placed the burden of
proof at trial on the property owner. Once the government showed probable cause to
seize the property, the burden was on the property owner to show by a preponderance of
the evidence that his property was not the product of illicit activity (Stahl 1992:284).
The scope of the statute was widened in 1978 and 1984. In 1978 Congress
amended Section 881, making profits from the illegal drug trade and assets purchased
with those profits forfeitable, including items intended to be traded for controlled
substances. The addition to Section 881 in 1984 authorized "the forfeiture of all real
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property used in any manner to facilitate a violation of drug laws" (Stahl 1992:277).
This amendment also allowed the value of civil forfeitures to be deposited in the U.S.
Treasury's general fund (Williams 2002:323), just as the value of the deodand was paid
to the royal exchequer in England (Finkelstein 1981:73). This was amended in 1986 to
allow federal agencies to keep forfeiture proceeds. This amendment also created the
equitable sharing program through which cooperating state and local law enforcement
agencies can keep up to 80% of the proceeds from a forfeiture, while federal funds are
deposited in the Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture Fund (Williams 2002:323).
This fund was designed and promoted as a way to increase cooperation between local and
federal law enforcement in the fight against drugs (Benson, Rasmussen and Sollars
1995:29).
The equitable sharing program was well received by state and local law
enforcement agencies. A 1987 survey by the Department of Justice found that 96 percent
of recipient agencies believed the program fostered cooperation between local and federal
law enforcement and 99 percent of respondents said they planned to contribute to joint
investigations in order to receive more money (Nelson 1992: 1328-1329). Law
enforcement in states that limited the amount of revenue an agency could receive through
forfeiture could hand local cases off to federal agencies for processing in federal courts, a
process known as "federal adoption", to receive a larger share of revenue (Nelson
1992: 1329). The National Governor's Association and law enforcement interest groups
successfully opposed an amendment to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 designed to
limit this practice and prevent the circumvention of state laws (Nelson 1992: 1330-133 1).
The amendment was stripped from the final bill and replaced with a statement
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encouraging future cooperation between the recipient agency and federal law
enforcement (Nelson 1992:1331-1332).
The goal of modern forfeiture legislation is to "remove the tools of crime from
criminal organizations, deprive wrongdoers of the proceeds of their crimes, recover
property that may be used to compensate victims and deter crime" (DOJ Asset Forfeiture
Program 2008:7). Some claim that forfeiture is a vital instrument in the fight against
crime because "most criminal acts have a financial motivation, and until we take away
the financial incentive to commit the particular criminal act it will continue" (Edgeworth
2008:xxx). In addition to punishing criminals and deterring crime, forfeiture revenue
helps finance law enforcement's efforts. The enforcement of drug laws is expensive and
strains local and state law enforcement budgets. Generating revenue for law enforcement
to continue this battle is a goal of the federal forfeiture program (Nelson 1992:1327).
The Bush administration encouraged the states to pass their own civil forfeiture
bills in the late 1980's (Jensen and Gerber 1996:423) and eventually 47 states and the
District of Columbia passed in rem forfeiture statutes, with most states modeling their
laws after the federal statute (Edgeworth 2008:35). States administer their own court
systems and are free to set the parameters of their forfeiture proceedings, such as the
standard of proof required, the effect of a conviction or acquittal of criminal charges and
how much law enforcement receives from forfeiture.
In Hawaii the law enforcement agency initiating the seizure keeps 25% of the
proceeds (Hawaii Revised Statutes Annotated 7 12A- 16(2)) and the standard of proof to
be met in the civil trial is a preponderance of the evidence (Hawaii Revised Statutes
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Annotateci 712A-IO(IO) and 712A-12(8)). In Alaska, however, the standard of proof is
probable cause (Alaska Statutes Annotated 17.30.1 14) and law enforcement can receive
up to 75% of the proceeds from forfeiture if the property involved is money or worth
more than $5,000 (Alaska Statutes Annotated 17.30.1 12).
California uses two different standards, clear and convincing evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt, depending on the property that is sought for forfeiture. Real
property, land and homes, and property such as boats, cars and air planes used to
manufacture or distribute narcotics are subject to a standard of beyond reasonable doubt,
which is the same standard required for a criminal conviction (California Health and
Safety Code 11488.4 (i)l). Forfeiture of cash and other "negotiable instruments" are
subject to the lower standard of clear and convincing evidence (California Health and
Safety Code 1 1488.4 (i)4). California's forfeiture statute also allows law enforcement to
keep 65% of forfeiture funds (California Health and Safety Code 1 1489 2(a)) and may
require a criminal conviction before real property can be forfeit (California Health and
Safety Code 11488.4(i)).
While civil in rem forfeiture is the most widely adopted forfeiture procedure in
the United States, 22 states have criminal in personam forfeiture statutes, which require a
conviction on criminal charges (Edgeworth 2008:5-7), and 10 states have civil in
personam statutes (Edgeworth 2008: 11). When pursued in civil court, in personam
forfeitures are declared after a judgement of liability against the property owner
(Edgeworth 2008: 1 1). Only two states, Nebraska and North Carolina, rely solely upon in
personam criminal forfeiture, while one state, New York, allows only civil in personam
forfeiture (Edgeworth 2008:36).
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Federal law underwent additional changes with passage of the Civil Asset
Forfeiture Reform Act, CAFRA, in 2001. The Act's changes were due to concerns over
the fairness of federal forfeiture proceedings and focused on procedural protections for
property owners. The Act raised the standard of proof from probable cause to a
preponderance of the evidence and shifted the burden from the property owner to the
government, in addition to creating an affirmative innocent owner defense (Moores
2009:783). The following section details the concerns that led to the reforms of 2001 and




Federal use of forfeiture increased dramatically after the reforms in 1984. Federal
forfeiture receipts increased from $27.2 million in 1985 to $644 million in 1991.
Equitable sharing payments increased from $17.1 million in 1986, the first year of
payments, to $279 million in 1991 (Nelson 1992:1324). Deposits in the asset forfeiture
fund increased to $507 million in fiscal year 2000 (Asset Forfeiture Fund Annual
Financial Statement FY 2000) to more than a billion dollars in 2006 (Asset Forfeiture
Fund Annual Financial Statement 2006: 1 1).
With the expansion came controversy. Henry Hyde, the late Republican
Congressman who sponsored CAFRA, expounded on the conflicts of interest and
constitutional and procedural problems with the civil forfeiture of property in his book
Forfeiting Our Property Rights. Hyde felt that civil forfeiture was "being abused on a
wholesale basis" and was "employed for ends unrelated to drug control" (Hyde 1995:2-
3). Hyde believed that forfeiture in its then-current form was a threat to basic American
rights including due process, property and civil rights (Hyde 1995:6-9). Civil forfeiture
was not a weapon for the modern war on drugs, but a "jurisprudential Frankenstein
monster" culled "from the dark recesses of past centuries" (Hyde 1995:1).
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The most common criticism of civil asset forfeiture is that it encourages so-called
"policing for profit" by providing law enforcement a financial incentive to forfeit
property. This incentive, it is argued, has lead to the distortion of law enforcement's
goals. Rather than focusing on decreasing the supply of drugs and putting criminals
behind bars, emphasis is placed on maximizing forfeitures to increase discretionary
budgets thus creating self-financing law enforcement agencies "divorced from legislative
oversight" (Blumenson and Nilsen 1998:40-41).
Relative law enforcement effort against drugs increased by 45 percent in the five
years following the reforms of 1984 as the number of drug arrests rose relative to arrests
for other crimes (Benson et al. 1995:22). Some argue that this change in priorities is a
result of changing incentives for police bureaucracies. After 1983 "[t]he relative
allocation of state and local law enforcement resources has shifted dramatically towards
drug enforcement", which provides the bulk of revenue from asset forfeiture (Benson et
al. 1995:38). The implication is that "asset forfeiture provisions of the federal statute
created an exogenous change in state and local law enforcement agencies' bureaucratic
incentives, inducing them to join in the federally declared war on drugs" (Benson et al.
1995:38).
The amount of money a law enforcement agency can receive from forfeiture is
large and proceeds from forfeiture are increasingly important for state and local law
enforcement agencies. The results of a survey of 1400 municipal and county law
enforcement executives found a substantial portion of respondents felt that forfeiture
proceeds were a necessary budgetary supplement. Nearly 40% of executives at large
agencies and just over 31% of executives at small agencies "agreed" or "strongly agreed"
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that civil forfeiture was a necessary budget supplement (Worrall 2001:179). A random
sample of 52 law enforcement agencies in Texas found that forfeiture proceeds made up
an average of 14% of the department's budget (Williams, Holcomb, Kovandzic and
Bullock 2010: 12) and some may rely on forfeiture to cover up to a third of their budgets
(Williams et al. 2010: 17). Despite this reliance on forfeiture as a budgetary supplement,
only 29 states require law enforcement agencies report how much money they raise
through forfeiture and what they spend the money on (Williams et al. 2010:13).
Forfeiture funds are especially important to the operation of multijurisdictional
drug task forces. It has been suggested that one large bust can be enough to make a
multijurisdictional task force financially independent and allow it to operate without the
need for state or federal assistance (Justice Research and Statistics Association 1993:9).
For example, annual statements from 2006 through 2008 show a single forfeiture case
valued at $337 million, three fraud cases totalling $842 million and $443 million from
five other major cases (Williams et al. 2010:30). In late 2009 a routine traffic stop in
Kansas resulted in the seizure of more than a million dollars in cash (Associated Press
2010). Similarly, an officer in Arizona confiscated $140,000 in cash in just two traffic
stops coming on consecutive days (Arizona Department of Public Safety 2009).
Though large forfeitures may have the potential to free a task force from reliance
on outside funding, most are quite small. In 1992 the state of California conducted over
6,000 forfeiture and 94% of them were valued at less than $5,000 (Mast, Benson and
Rasmussen 2000:288). While advocates of asset forfeiture suggest that forfeiture is a
valuable weapon against major offenders, so-called "reverse stings" are being conducted
where police pose as sellers rather than buyers. Drug buyers are more likely to have cash
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on hand that police may seize and "evidence indicates that a significant percentage of
state and local forfeiture actions are initiated against suspected low-to moderate-level
offenders", not the high level targets that would yield very large seizures (Williams et al.
2010:18,20).
Critics fear self-financing law enforcement agencies, but recent increases in the
use of forfeiture may be a result of decreased funding from cash-strapped state and local
governments. The panel who reviewed the Metro Gang Strike Force in Minnesota
suggested that one of the causes may have been the loss of state funding for the task
force's predecessor. Members of the force used the term "money police" to refer to their
focus on seizures and forfeitures. The report also suggests that some of the members of
the Strike Force developed "a mentality that forfeiture funds were necessary to make
certain the Strike Force would survive" (Luger and Egelhof 2009:7).
The "appalling and outrageous" behavior found by the review panel in their
investigation of the Metro Gang Strike Force in Minnesota was related to the seizure and
forfeiture of small amounts of cash. They reported a massive discrepancy between the
"hard and thorough" work done on gang-related cases and the "unfocused, and
sometimes unethical and highly questionable conduct" of others conducting stops and
searches not related to gang activity and in the use of saturation details (Luger and
Egelhof 2009: 10). Saturation details, originally intended to "provid[e] a law enforcement
presence at locations where gang members were expected to congregate", grew to include
stops and searches of individuals that were not related to gang activity (Luger and
Egelhof 2009:5). Equally troubling to the review panel was the finding that officers and
their families were allowed to purchase items from the evidence room "including flat
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screen and large screen televisions, jet skis, [and] a trailer" at "low prices" (Luger and
Egelhof 2009:4). Property that had been reported as destroyed was found both in and
outside of the evidence locker (Luger and Egelhof 2009:4).
In Indiana, Delaware County Prosecutor Mark McKinney came under scrutiny for
using confidential agreements to control the dispersion of assets seized by the Muncie-
Delaware County Drug Task Force (AP State and Local Wire: August 19, 2008). Though
criminal charges were not filed against him, the county prosecutor determined that he
acted in good faith (AP State and Local Wire: May 7, 2009), the mayor of Muncie has
filed an ethics complaint against him with the Indiana Supreme Court's disciplinary
commission. (AP State and Local Wire: August 19, 2008).
Concerns have also arisen over the use of private attorneys to represent of drug
task forces and law enforcement in civil forfeiture cases. While allowing prosecutors to
profit from forfeiture may exacerbate the perceived conflict of interest, allowing private
attorneys to receive money from forfeiture may be even worse due to the lack of
accountability. With publicly appointed prosecutors, voters and citizens can directly hold
public officials accountable for their misdeeds in elections and through legislative
lobbying. Private attorneys are not subject to such pressures and the public has no power
to directly punish or control questionable behavior (Balko 2010).
These incentives make the use of the civil court system and in rem forfeiture more
problematic. The civil legal system's lower standards of proof and evidentiary
requirements allow police to seize property from people whom they could never convict
of a crime in criminal court. Prior estimates suggest as much as 80% of forfeitures occur
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without criminal charges ever being filed (Blumenson and Nilsen:77) and acquittal of the
crime underlying the forfeiture may not prevent property from being forfeit if the
government has enough evidence to meet the civil standard of proof (Edgeworth 2008:8).
Nearly all state civil asset forfeiture statutes, as well as the federal statutes, set the
standard of proof below what is required for a criminal conviction. While a prosecutor
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that a person has committed a crime before they
are convicted and punished, prosecutors in states such as Alaska, Delaware and Montana
only have to show probable cause in order to seize and forfeit property1. Under federal
law, the standard to be met by the prosecution is a preponderance of the evidence, which
is more stringent than probable cause but still less than what is required in criminal court
(Edgeworth 2008: 138). Though there are some states that have higher standards of proof
than the federal government and place the burden at clear and convincing evidence, most
forfeiture actions require the prosecution to meet a lower burden of proof than required
for a conviction of the alleged criminal conduct that justifies the forfeiture (Williams et
al. 2010:22).
Not only is the standard to be met lower than what is required for criminal
prosecution, but civil forfeiture can occur when no criminal charges are filed, if criminal
charges are dismissed or the defendant is acquitted at trial (Edgeworth 2008: 8). Property
owners contest only 20% of forfeitures and the lower standards used in civil forfeiture
actions may be met with evidence that would not typically be enough to gain a criminal
conviction (Moores 2009:77). Prior to CAFRA, forfeiture proceedings in federal court
1 Alaska Revised Statutes 17.30.1 14, Brown v. State 721 A.2d 1263 and Montana Code Annotated 44-12-
103
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allowed hearsay evidence (Edgeworth 2008: 137) and in its current form, the standard of
proof can be met solely through the use of circumstantial evidence (Edgeworth
2008: 147). Statutes in some states, much like the federal statute before CAFRA' s
reforms, presume the property guilty and the burden is on the property owner to prove his
property was not involved in a crime, a reversal of the constitutional doctrine of
"innocent until proven guilty" which is used in criminal law (Williams et al. 2010:23).
The heart of this controversy over civil forfeiture procedure is a basic concern for
the constitutional protection of due process. The Supreme Court ruling in Bennis v.
Michigan affirmed the government's ability to seize and forfeit property when the
property owner neither knows about, nor sanctions, the illicit behavior that gives rise to
the forfeiture. The plaintiff in the case, Tina Bennis, jointly owned a car with her
husband. The car was seized after her husband was caught engaging in sexual activity
with a prostitute in the car. The state of Michigan filed suit against the car to declare it a
public nuisance in accordance with its abatement scheme and Mrs. Bennis challenged the
forfeiture on the basis that she did not know her husband would use the car for sex with a
prostitute (443-444). She appealed the forfeiture, arguing that the forfeiture violated the
Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the Takings clause of the
Fifth Amendment (443). The Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture citing "a long and
unbroken line of cases", including The Palmyra, Van Oster and J. W. Goldsmith, that held
property may be forfeit even when the owner did not know that their property would be
used to break the law (446).
Forfeiture as currently defined and practiced is partly considered punishment for a
crime. The Supreme Court ruled in Austin v. United States that forfeiture under section
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881 was "a monetary punishment" and so would be limited by the Excessive Fines clause
of the Eighth Amendment. The legislative record indicates Congress "understood the
provisions as serving to deter and punish", despite any remedial purposes. This is also
indicated in the way Section 881 "[ties] forfeitures directly to the commission of drug
offenses" and provides for innocent owner defenses. These would not be provided if
forfeiture was not considered, at least in part, a punishment.
This has led some to question the validity of the in rem forfeiture classification.
Civil forfeiture ostensibly punishes property owners for criminal activity yet the actual
guilt or innocence of the owner does not matter because the focus of the proceeding,
indeed the defendant in court, is the property itself. On its face, the decision in Austin v.
United States is absurd. In order to apply the Excessive Fines clause to in rem forfeiture,
the court has to ignore "the fact that the property itself, not its possessor or owner, is the
true defendant". This muddies the distinction between in rem and in personam
jurisdiction by suggesting some sort of personal culpability despite the defendant being
an inanimate object (Harrington 1994:283). Doing so "casts doubt on the legitimacy of
the entire civil forfeiture regime, not just the drug laws themselves" and forfeiture that
takes into personal culpability into account should not occur in rem (Harrington
1994:333).
In the eyes of critics, civil forfeiture is a "criminal sanction... camouflaged as a
civil one" (Jensen and Gerber 1992:429). The Constitution explicitly states that no state
may "deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law" yet civil
in rem forfeiture proceedings do not offer the full range of due process protections given
in a criminal trial and law enforcement's "ability to bypass constitutional rights is not
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simply fortuitous circumstances for the government; rather, it is precisely the reason
these civil forfeiture actions are chosen" (Yoskowitz quoted in Nelson 1992).
This aversion to procedural protection for property owners is further complicated
by overlap in state and federal jurisdictions. States seeking to protect property owners
from the problems associated with forfeiture by altering state law may have these
protections sidestepped by law enforcement. How this occurs is described in the
following section, which examines the practice of federal adoption and how it enables




The scope of federal criminal law has expanded greatly in the past 30 years.
Federal criminal jurisdiction was limited in the years following ratification of the
constitution, focusing on explicitly federal crimes such as counterfeiting. Beginning in
the 1970's, Congress expanded federal criminal statutes to include crimes already
covered by state and local laws (Miller and Eisenstein 2005:242). This led to a massive
overlap in federal and state criminal jurisdiction and has been driven largely by federal
statutes related to guns and drugs. Roughly 5% of crimes prosecuted in federal court in
1997 had no legal state or local counterpart and in 2002 nearly half of all offenders
incarcerated in federal prison were convicted of drug offenses (Miller and Eisenstein
2005:244). The overlap in state and federal drug penalties is so great that cases involving
small amounts of drugs can be prosecuted in federal court. For example, a drug dealer
arrested in Virginia for selling $20 worth of crack cocaine to an undercover officer was
prosecuted in federal court in 1994 (Heller 1997:1309).
Overlapping state and federal jurisdiction introduces a strategic element to
criminal prosecution by giving prosecuting attorneys a choice between state and federal
court. Local prosecutors can allow cases to go to federal court and can use the possibility
of longer prison sentences as leverage in plea negotiations. Federal prosecutors can
choose to take cases to federal court if state sentencing is deemed too lenient or the case
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would be difficult to prosecute (Miller and Eisenstein 2005:247). Federal law also offers
a number of procedural advantages over some state laws, including more favorable
evidentiary standards (Miller and Eisenstein 2005:248 Table 1).
Similarly, state prosecutors and law enforcement agencies can request a federal
agency to file their civil forfeiture cases in federal court. Most civil forfeitures are
attached to drug violations and the overlap in criminal statutes is so great that nearly
every drug related forfeiture can be moved to federal court (Nelson 1992:1318). Law
enforcement may want to move a case to federal court because state laws may be
considered inadequate to successfully seize a piece of property or make a successful
forfeiture difficult or unfeasible. Local authorities may not have the means to properly
manage the seized property, using state courts may mean a delay in seizure that could
devalue the property or the state or local prosecutor might decline to move forward with
legal proceedings. The practice of state and local law enforcement handing cases over to
federal authorities is known as "federal adoption" or "adoptive forfeiture" and this
effectively changes the rules under which forfeiture takes place by moving the venue
from state court to federal court (Edgeworth 2008:66-67).
Though the expansion of federal criminal law has not come at the expense of state
law, the federal government, by extending into areas of criminal law formerly left to the
states, may be effectively subverting state law by giving state and local law enforcement
access to federal civil forfeiture trials (Heller 1997:1312). While federal criminal
prosecution subjects the offender to "more severe punishment than similarly situated
offenders who are prosecuted in state court" they are nevertheless accorded the same
constitutional due process protections in both venues (Heller 1997: 1312). This is not
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true of property owners who have their property seized and forfeit through federal
proceedings.
Federal civil forfeiture law offers property owners fewer procedural protections
than many state laws do and state protections can be circumvented through federal
adoption. Karis Ann-Yu Chi (2002) suggests that the existence of federal adoption, what
she refers to as the "federal loophole", has undermined California's efforts to reform
asset forfeiture in the state. Federal adoption offers several advantages for law
enforcement agencies in California. It bypasses procedural reforms California
implemented when the statute was renewed in 1994, including a provision requiring both
a criminal conviction and a showing of beyond a reasonable doubt for a prosecutor to
forfeit property.
It also allows California's state and local law enforcement to receive a larger
percentage of proceeds from forfeiture through the federal equitable sharing program
(Ann Yu-Chi 2002: 1663). A local agency may only receive 65% of the proceeds from a
forfeiture action under California law but under federal equitable sharing guidelines they
may receive 80% (Ann-Yu Chi 2002: 1663). The adopting federal agency receives a flat
20% of the proceeds from cases where the local or state agency passing the case on has
done 100% of the investigative work (Equitable Sharing Guidelines:8), thus state and
local agencies profit the most when handing over wholly local cases. There are
restrictions on the cases federal agencies can adopt, most notably threshold values for
property. Seized vehicles, as well as cash and all other property, must be worth at least
$5,000, vessels at least $10,000 and aircraft at least $10,000. Real estate must be worth
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at least $20,000 in order for a federal agency to adopt the case, however some exceptions
may occur due to mitigating circumstances (Equitable Sharing Guidelines: 4).
The financial incentives of federal adoption have long been a concern of forfeiture
critics. Blumenson and Nilsen (1998) suggest that federal equitable sharing has "given
state and local police an enormous economic stake in the federal forfeiture law" and
"produced a major shift toward federal jurisdiction over local law enforcement" by
making it more profitable for state and local departments to hand their cases over to
federal agencies (51-52). Benson and Rasmussen (1996) suggest that state and local law
enforcement agencies responded to the economic incentive provided by equitable sharing
with an expansion of drug enforcement efforts (166). They note that this gives police
bureaucracies the ability to raise funds outside of the normal bureaucratic routes as well
as "creating] the potential for bureaucratic managers to expand their discretionary
budget" (175). Cooperating bureaucrats and their agencies have much to gain by
bypassing state restrictions on the funds they receive from forfeiture.
While an agency in California may only see a marginal increase in return from an
adoptive forfeiture, agencies in more restrictive states have the potential for far greater
returns. While the Justice Department requires that equitable sharing payments are used
only for law enforcement purposes, statutes in some states allocate forfeiture proceeds for
other purposes. An investigation by the Kansas City Star in 2000 found that "little or no
money" from forfeiture was going to the education funds state laws mandated they go to
(Dillon 2000). Two of the states, Nebraska and North Carolina, do not have civil
forfeiture statutes and so not only were distribution statutes being circumvented but also
the procedural protections of afforded by state law (Dillon 2000).
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In 2000 voters in Oregon and Utah passed ballot initiatives to reform asset
forfeiture laws and limit the use of federal adoption to bypass state law. Sections 8 and 9
of the Oregon Property Protection Act of 2000 and section 15 of the Utah Property
Protection Act of 2000 mandate that equitable sharing payments be made in accordance
with state law and that local forfeiture cases cannot be adopted by a federal agency
without approval by a state court. Both states saw huge drops in equitable sharing
payments in 2002, the year following implementation of the acts, but payments returned
to pre-initiative levels in the years after (Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund
Reports 2003, 2004). Efforts to amend federal forfeiture law to distribute equitable
sharing payments in accordance with state guidelines have been successfully opposed
(Nelson 1992: 1331).
Though many critics have written about the way federal adoption allows local law
enforcement to circumvent state laws, there have been few systematic inquiries into the
practice (Mast et al. 2000; Stahl 1992; Blumenson and Nilsen 1998). Worrall and
Kovandzic (2008) performed a statistical analysis of the practice and found "some
preliminary evidence that forfeiture turns policing in policing for profit" (239). In their
study, they compared rates of equitable sharing payments with state laws governing how
much money a department may receive from forfeiture. States that allowed agencies to
keep all of the proceeds were coded as 1 and states that restricted the receivable amount
were coded as 0. They found that more equitable sharing activity occurred in states that
restricted the amount an agency may receive, suggesting that law enforcement in those
states sought to maximize the revenue produced from forfeiture. They close by
suggesting that this is not necessarily an alarming finding and that "[i]t is difficult to fault
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law-enforcement agencies for exploiting legal arrangements that maximize their potential
to offset the high costs associated with America's war on drugs" (239).
Worrall and Kovandzic's analysis is limited however, and does not address many
of the concerns about federal adoption, namely the lack of procedural protections for
defendants under federal law. Though it is hard to fault cash-strapped law enforcement
agencies from using federal courts to maximize their returns from forfeiture, revenue may
only be part of the reason to use federal adoption as suggested earlier. State and local law
enforcement may use federal adoption to sidestep procedural protections designed to
limit abuse of the law (Ann-Yu Chi 2002:1636-1637). By focusing solely on the revenue
received by an agency, Worrall and Kovandzic's analysis may be overlooking other
important considerations. In some instances, it may make more sense for an agency in a
generous state to accept a lower payout for a forfeiture action in federal court because of
a lower standard of proof or accept a smaller payout in state court for similar reasons.
The legal rules governing forfeiture procedure may play a large part in the decision to
request federal adoption.
One study (Williams et al. 2010) suggests that it is more than the financial
incentive driving the use of federal adoption. The study, sponsored by the libertarian
public interest law firm the Institute for Justice, found that a state's standard of proof, in
conjunction with its innocent owner protections, also affects the use of federal adoption
by law enforcement. In states where owners are presumed innocent, raising the standard
of proof one level increases equitable sharing payments by $16,860 a year for average-
sized law enforcement agencies. This effect was not seen in states where owners are
presumed guilty and the burden of proof lies on the owner (39).
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Additionally, innocent owner protections enhance the effect of financial
incentives. When the property owner is presumed guilty, increasing the financial
incentive at the state level leads to pronounced decreases in equitable sharing payments.
A 25% increase in a law enforcement agency's ability to profit from forfeiture is
associated with a decrease in equitable sharing payments of $9,750 per year, compared to
a decrease of $7,500 without the innocent owner protections (39). They conclude by
stating "[i]n short, all of these results demonstrate that all three factors of state forfeiture
law that we studied—profit motive, innocent owner burden and standard of proof—
impact whether law enforcement agencies choose to pursue equitable sharing" (40).
Increased cooperation between state and federal agents may aid in the fight
against drug trafficking but it also may be leading to the federalization of entirely local
law enforcement functions and cases. The degree of overlap in federal and state drug
laws means "there is no longer any state drug offense not covered by federal law". This
means that "every drug offense... from simple possession to mass distribution, triggers
the forfeiture statute" (Nelson 1992:1318). Since federal agencies can adopt cases that
are wholly local in origin and on which they have not conducted any investigative work,
the line between state and federal law becomes nebulous and property rights become
dependent on the discretion of the prosecuting attorney and law enforcement in the same
way a drug offender's sentence does.
Concern about the constitutional and practical implications of federal involvement
in law enforcement is not new. David Fellman (1945) suggested that increased use of
constitutionally delegated federal powers, such as the power of taxation or the regulation
of interstate commerce, for the enforcement of criminal laws would lead to increasingly
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dishonest governance. For example, the constitutionality of Harrison Narcotic Tax Act of
1914 was challenged based on the grounds that it was not "in truth a revenue measure and
a bonafide exercise of the power of Congress". Its status as a revenue measure was
suggested to be "mere subterfuge, by which the police power reserved to States was
usurped and the constitutional limitations of Congress evaded" (Virginia Law Review
1920:535).
Fellman argues that if the federal government can use the power of taxation to
arrest criminals, then it plausibly could "build electricity plants under the guise of
improving navigation, when neither taxation nor navigation are the real purposes in
view" (Fellman 1945:23). He suggests that such dishonest justifications would
eventually "make a mockery of the whole notion of constitutional limitations, if not the
very concept of constitutional law itself (Fellman 1945:23-24). These inferences can be
applied to the current application civil asset forfeiture. The in rem legal classification is
based on an acknowledged legal fiction. Property can not commit crime and the creation
of federal and state in rem forfeiture statutes coincides with the expansion of criminal
prosecution of the modern war on drugs. It is expressly stated to be a tool for law
enforcement, as a deterrent and a punishment for financially motivated crimes (Asset
Forfeiture Program 2008:7). Yet forfeiture proceedings still occur under the auspices of
civil proceedings and the Supreme Court has yet to overturn the practice.
The following section addresses the questions that recur throughout the literature
concerning federal adoption. Tests are conducted to examine the effect of procedural and
financial provisions of state forfeiture laws on equitable sharing payments in an attempt




Do state and local law enforcement agencies venue shop for more favorable
forfeiture rules? Does the structure of state forfeiture law affect the use of federal
adoption? Do state and local law enforcement agencies use federal adoption to side step
state courts for more favorable federal proceedings? The relationship between state and
federal law is the focus of this study. It will explore the criticism espoused by critics
such as Stahl, Benson and Rasmussen and Blumenson and Nilsen that federal adoption is
being used to circumvent state law. To address these questions, this thesis tests the
following hypotheses:
Hi: States that require a criminal conviction before civil forfeiture actions can
take place will have higher rates of equitable sharing than states that do not.
H2: States that set their standard of proof higher than the federal standard will
have higher rates of equitable sharing than states that do not.
H3: States that restrict the amount of money law enforcement may receive from
forfeiture will have higher rates of equitable sharing than states that do not.
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These three hypotheses are tested against their nulls.
Hi: States that require a criminal conviction before civil forfeiture actions can
take place will have the same rates of equitable sharing as states that do not.
H2: States that set their standard of proof higher than the federal standard will
have the same rates of equitable sharing as states that do not.
H3: States that restrict the amount of money law enforcement may receive from
forfeiture will have the same rates of equitable sharing as states that do not.
The best way to test these hypotheses is to examine equitable sharing payments to
state and local law enforcement. Only 29 states require law enforcement agencies to
report on forfeiture revenue and there is no data source that provides exactly how many
wholly local cases are adopted by federal authorities for forfeiture. This makes looking
directly at adoptive cases impossible. Despite this issue, there are sources available that
provide information on income received through the equitable sharing program.
There exist only two nationwide sources for information on forfeiture income and
the most reliable data on these payments come from the Department of Justice. This data
is limited to departments that participate in the equitable sharing program and includes all
income from adoptive forfeitures. It is the most comprehensive and reliable source of
data on forfeiture and forms the basis for the analysis. The Law Enforcement
Management and Administration Survey asks respondents about income from forfeiture,
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however these are only estimates and the statistics provided may combine income from
federal and state forfeiture actions.
In order to test how state forfeiture procedure affects aggregate use of federal
adoption by state and local law enforcement, the unit of analysis will be the individual
state. The dependent variable is equitable sharing rate. It is defined as the per capita rate
of total money paid to state and local law enforcement agencies. This is calculated by
dividing total equitable sharing payments made to state and local law enforcement by
state population and multiplying by one-thousand. Creating a rate based on population
gives an idea of how pervasive adoption is throughout the state, not just in those
departments who take part in the program. The numbers used for this calculation are
taken from the US Department of Justice record of equitable sharing payments made
during fiscal year 2008 and US Census estimates of state population in 2008.
Since only one year of equitable sharing data is used in the analysis and the data
set is limited to the 50 states, the possibility of outliers affecting the regression is strong.
Due to extraordinary circumstances, the rates of Virginia and West Virginia will be
adjusted to be more representative of their normal income from equitable sharing. Both
states received exceptionally large payments in 2007 and 2008 from a rather unusual
case. The payments stem from a lawsuit against Purdue Pharma, the maker of the
prescription painkiller Oxycontin. The Western District of Virginia investigated the
company for allegedly misrepresenting the addictiveness of Oxycontin when marketing
the drug to physicians in order to increase sales. When it was over, the company and 3
executives plead guilty to fraudulently marketing the drug and paid more than $634
million dollars to settle both the civil and criminal suits. $276 million was deposited in
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the federal asset forfeiture fund and the state police departments of West Virginia and
Virginia each received $44 million for their roles in the investigation (Sluss 2007). The
$44 million was split in two payments; one for $24 million in 2007 and another for $20
million in 2008.
The 2008 payment to West Virginia makes it an extreme outlier in the data set.
Its rate is triple that of the next highest state, Virginia, and is more than 9 times the
average rate of $12,537 and of the highly skewed standard deviation of $16,129. Its ?
score is over 6, making the probability of that rate randomly appearing in a normal
distribution roughly one in one million. Payments made to the state from 2000 to 2006
and in 2009 were much lower. The largest total amount paid to the state in those years
was just over a million dollars and the average amount of equitable sharing payments in
those years is $643,456.
Though Virginia's rate is not affected as much because of its larger population,
the amount they received is equally unrepresentative of their normal income from
equitable sharing. Between 2000 and 2008, the average total payment to Virginia was
$9,106,736, less than half of what was received in 2008. This average is misleading
though, as between 2000 and 2006 Virginia did not receive more than $5 million in total
equitable sharing payments in a given year. The same can be said of West Virginia's
average between 2000 and 2008, $5,505,859, where the highest one year total between
2000 and 2006 was $1,044,905. Both averages are greatly distorted by the two payments
from the Purdue Pharma case.
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Due to the singular and highly unusual nature of the Virginia and West Virginia
payments, rates for those two states will be calculated based on the median value of the
total equitable sharing payments made between 2000 and 2008. Virginia's median for
that time period is $4,147,130 and West Virginia's is $571,932. These are far more
representative of the states' normal income from equitable sharing and are quite close to
what their income would have been in 2007 and 2008 absent the Purdue Pharma income.
Additional information, including payment information for the time period used for this
calculation, is included in the appendix.
To assess the relationship between state and federal law, the independent
variables will include conviction requirement, standard of proof and state revenue
distribution programs. States that require a criminal conviction before forfeiture may
occur are coded 1 and states that do not have a conviction requirement for civil forfeiture
are coded 0 and are based on information in Edgeworth (2008:136-137). Nebraska and
North Carolina are coded 1 due to their reliance criminal forfeiture. States are coded
from 1-4 depending on the burden of proof used. States that set their burden of proof at
probable cause are coded 1, a preponderance of the evidence are coded 2, clear and
convincing evidence is coded 3 and states that set their burden at beyond a reasonable
doubt are coded 4. States that use multiple standards of proof will be coded based on the
lower standard. Some states base the shift in standard on the value of the property to be
forfeit and others base it on the kind of property to be forfeit. In most cases, the higher
standard is used for more real and high value property (Williams et al. 2010:22 Table 2).
Because most forfeitures are rather small in value, the lower standard affects covers more
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cases and is likely to be more representative of the procedural hurdle faced by law
enforcement.
Standard of proof is presented as an ordinal variable here, however the qualitative
differences in standards do not lend themselves to quantitative coding. The difference
between probable cause and preponderance of the evidence is not the same as the
difference between clear and convincing evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt and
this may mask the effect of standard of proof to some extent. This ordering of standards
is an approximation of their relative differences, lowest to highest, and needs to be kept
in mind when interpreting the results.
Coding for standard of proof is based on Edgeworth's (2008) table of in rem
forfeiture statutes (139-142). Alabama and Wisconsin, however, use standards that do
not fit into the coding scheme. Alabama uses prima facie evidence and Wisconsin places
its standard at reasonable certainty. It would be problematic to simply exclude these
states because of the extremely small sample size. Excluding them could skew the results
and cast doubt on the validity of any conclusions drawn from them. In order to include
them in the sample, they will be categorized with their closest counterparts. Prima facie
evidence is the lowest burden of proof and required for any case to proceed. As such
Alabama will be coded 1 for probable cause and Wisconsin will be coded 4 for beyond a
reasonable doubt. These categorizations are the same used by Williams et al. (2010) in
their analysis.
While the coding for standard of proof is based on civil in rem statutes, New York
uses a civil in personam statute and two states, North Carolina and Nebraska, only allow
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forfeitures through criminal prosecution. The burdens for these states are coded based on
these statutes. North Carolina and Nebraska's burdens are coded 4 for beyond a
reasonable doubt and New York is 2 for preponderance of the evidence. The standards
for these states are included despite the technical differences between civil in personam
forfeiture, criminal forfeiture and civil in rem forfeiture since they represent similar
hurdles to be overcome by law enforcement. Agencies in states that only allow forfeiture
through criminal proceedings and those in states that require clear and convincing
evidence through their civil in rem statute have similar procedural incentives to use the
federal system and so logically both agencies may be equally drawn to federal adoption.
The final independent variable is revenue distribution. States are categorized as
"Generous" or "Not generous". "Generous" states are coded 1 while "Not Generous"
states are coded 0. "Generous" states are those that allow law enforcement to keep more
than 80% of the proceeds from a forfeiture and "Not Generous" states restrict forfeiture
income to less than 80%. This cut off point is chosen because the maximum amount of
revenue a state law enforcement agency may receive through the federal equitable
sharing program is 80%. If a law enforcement agency wants to maximize their income
from forfeiture, they would opt for state courts when they can receive more than the
federal standard and federal courts when they receive less. The dummy variable
approach is necessary due to the wide variation in state distribution schemes. Worrall
and Kovandzic, who use a similar coding scheme, note that "no ordinal, interval, or ratio
ordering to states' forfeiture laws [exist]" (Worrall and Kovandzic 2008:30). This coding
is based on Edgeworth's index of state distribution laws (Edgeworth 2008:225-233).
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Two control variables will be included in the regression analysis; drug arrest rate
and poverty rate. Drug arrest rate is calculated using statistics from the FBI's Uniform
Crime Reports for 2008. Reported drug arrests are divided by the state's population as
estimated by the Census Bureau and multiplied by 10,000 to achieve an arrest rate per





Law enforcement in all 50 states received money through federal equitable
sharing payments in 2008. Sharing rates ranged from South Dakota at the bottom at a
rate of $84 per 10,000 people and Nebraska at the top with a rate of $27,639 while the
nationwide average is $9,73 1. Twenty-eight of the 50 states fell below this average. Of
the 50 states, 1 1 have some form of conviction requirement, 1 1 allow law enforcement to
keep more money than the federal equitable sharing allows and 13 use standards of proof
lower than the federal standard.






































































































When looking at average equitable sharing rates across the categories of standard
of proof, there is dramatic difference between the highest and lowest standards and a
small difference between the two middle standards. Average rate of equitable sharing in
states that use probable cause is $7,968 and average rate of sharing in states that use
beyond a reasonable doubt is $17,922. This is double the lowest category's average and
the difference between the two means is statistically significant at .05. The two middle
categories are closer together with average rates of $9,133 and $1 1,001 for
preponderance of evidence and clear and convincing evidence respectively. When
grouped, the difference between states that set their standards at or above the federal
standard and those using a lower standard is insignificant despite the difference between
the two means being a relatively large $2,383.
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Conviction Requirement
Similarly, average rates are higher in states that require a conviction before
forfeiture. The average adoption rate in states that require a conviction is $14,745 while
states that do not average $8,317, a difference which is statistically significant at.01 in a
one tailed test. Average rates of adoption are also higher in states that allow law
enforcement to keep a smaller share of forfeiture proceeds than federal law allows,
$10,200 compared to $8,069 in generous states, however the difference between these
two means is not statistically significant.
Associations exist in the data, including several correlations which are both
positive and significant. The association between standard of proof and equitable sharing
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rate is positive and significant, with a Pearson's R of .355, significant at the .01 level in a
one tailed test. Conviction requirement and equitable sharing rate are also significantly
associated and have a Pearson's R of .466, significant at the .01 level in a one tailed test.
The association between the third independent variable, revenue distribution, and
equitable sharing rate is signed in the expected negative direction with a Pearson's R
score of -.154 but is not significant.
The correlation matrix also shows a highly significant association between
conviction requirement and standard of proof. The relationship makes intuitive sense
because a state that provides more procedural protection in one area, standard of proof,
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Table 2. Pearson's R scores for Independent and Dependent Variables
Equitable Standard Conviction Revenue Poverty .
Sharing Rate of Proof Requirement Distribution Rate R
Equitable
Sharing Rate

































may be more likely to provide it in another, requiring a conviction. However, this means
multicollinearity will be an issue in any regression model that includes both variables.
To address this, the variables will be separated in two different regression analyses.
In the case of the first hypothesis, the null can safely be rejected. Conviction
requirement is not only significantly correlated with equitable sharing rate, but the
regression results show that of all the independent variables, the strongest predictor of
equitable sharing is conviction requirement. When controlling for drug arrests and
poverty rate, the regression model accounts for accounts for over 25% of the variation in
equitable sharing rate. Equitable sharing rate increases by $6,427 when a conviction is
required at the state level. The full model using the two control variables and revenue
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Table 3 - OLS Regression Coefficients of State Asset Forfeiture Laws and Their Effect on Equitable
Sharing Rates
Independent Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant
1338.18 -2359.82 882.73 677.35 -2899.17
(-3814.38) (-4466.97) (-4301.17) (-3858.59) (-4454.42)
Conviction 6427.12*** 6068.60***




(-927.14) " " (-931.73)
-3141.15 -1925.93 -2474.59
(-1973.49) (-1804.16) (-1915.24)
90.42* 65.83 91.56 93.63* 71.93
Drug Arrest Rate (.41.18) (-45) (-45.96) (-41.23) (-44.93)
254.44 366.84 451.57 335.27 462.24
Poverty Rate (-248.04) (-267.17) (-287.14) (-159.71) (-275.34)
Adjusted R Squared 0.254 0.138 0.076 0.257 0.151
N 50 50 50 50 50
Coefficients are unstandardized with standard errors in parentheses.
Model land 4 are significant at .01
Model 2 and 5 are significant at .05
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
distribution accounts for a similar amount of variation in the dependent variable and a
similar slope. Both models and conviction requirement are significant at .001.
The null can safely be rejected in the case of the second hypothesis as well. Like
conviction requirement, standard of proof is significantly correlated with equitable
sharing and OLS regression confirms the effect of standard of proof on equitable sharing.
When controlling for drug arrest rate and poverty rate, a one unit increase in standard of
proof at the state level increases equitable sharing rate by $2,279 and the model accounts
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for over 13% of the variation in equitable sharing rate. When revenue distribution is
included with standard of proof and the control variables, the model accounts for a
similar amount of variation and a single unit increase in standard of proof increases
equitable sharing rate by $2,092. Both of the full models are significant largely due to
the influence of conviction requirement and standard of proof.
In the case of the third hypothesis, the null cannot be rejected. Revenue
distribution is not significantly associated with equitable sharing nor is the variable
significant in any of the regression models. This may be due to the fairly small data set
used, as well as the use of only one year of data. Previous studies that produced
significant results used different research designs and used agency level data instead of




The results provide evidence that procedural protections at the state level are
bypassed through local collaboration with federal law enforcement, the use of federal
adoption and the federal court system. Perhaps the most important finding is that average
rates of equitable sharing are significantly higher in states that may require a criminal
conviction before property can be forfeit than states that do not. When CAFRA was
introduced civil forfeiture filings outnumbered criminal filings by the federal government
(US Department of Justice 2000). Criminal forfeitures by the federal government have
increased in the past decade and now make up the majority of forfeitures by federal law
enforcement (US Department of Justice 2008). This stands in stark contrast to the
situation in the states where a minority have criminal forfeiture laws and whose
procedural protections are undercut by the federal government's civil forfeiture statutes.
The significance of standard of proof reinforces previous findings by Williams et
al. (2010). Both standard of proof and conviction requirement may be tapping into the
same procedural concept. Both of them represent procedural hurdles that must be crossed
in order to provide protection for property owners. However, due to the differences in
civil and criminal procedures, it may be easier to obtain a civil judgement by meeting a
higher burden of proof in a civil trial than it is to achieve a conviction on criminal
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charges. These are criteria that must be met to forfeit property, whereas receiving
revenue is the reward for meeting the criteria.
The insignificance of revenue distribution highlights this aspect of the decision
making process. State and local law enforcement as an industry should move in ways to
maximize their benefits and budgets and quite rationally would have a preference for
receiving as much money as possible for an individual forfeiture. States with lower
standards of proof and that do not require conviction potentially give law enforcement
more opportunities for forfeiture. Not requiring a conviction means investigations that do
not pan out and yield insufficient evidence to secure a conviction would potentially still
yield civil forfeitures. A conviction and the evidence used at trial or a guilty plea to
related charges would provide enough evidence to meet any standard in a civil trial,
especially when the property being seized is essentially tied to the act giving rise to the
conviction. This makes the pool of departments that can take part in forfeiture larger by
making it easier for smaller departments with less investigative power to engage in
forfeiture and increases the number of cases large departments can take to court.
Furthermore, there are many aspects of state law that may shape the decision
making process in regard to adoptive forfeiture. For example, allowing prosecutors to
keep a portion of the forfeiture proceeds may factor into how aggressively state
forfeitures are prosecuted. The complexities of state laws and the behavior they may be
promoting are hidden when focusing on aggregate nationwide data.
Though these results may reinforce prior findings about asset forfeiture, it is
important to note that because of the use of population level data, the results cannot be
used to explain behavior of individual law enforcement agencies. Prior research by
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Williams et al. (2010) found that higher standards of proof in conjunction with innocent
owner protections increased equitable sharing payments and by Worrall and Kovandzic
(2008) who found that equitable sharing payments were affected by state restrictions on
agency income from forfeiture, is based on agency level data. The results here only
suggest that law enforcement as a whole in each state use federal adoption less when they
are not subjected to higher standards of proof and when they are not required to convict
the person whose property is being seized.
There is also an issue with coding standard of proof on a scale as is done here.
The difference between each level is not the same and the actual effect of the variable
may be underestimated. Not only do the qualitative differences between the levels make
it difficult to code, but the individualized procedures and judicial rules concerning
evidence admissibility at the state level may affect the results as well. Two states may
have similar standards but depending on precedent set in state court the standard may be
easier to meet in one and not the other. Administrative forfeiture statutes, provisions
allowing law enforcement to seize property based on probable cause and forfeit the
property if the seizure is not contested, may also affect this variable (Edgeworth 2008:3).
Since so many forfeitures are uncontested, the standard may effectively be probable
cause in those states.
Additionally, this study focuses on only one year of data and so should be
interpreted with caution. Despite this shortcoming, the coding schemes used provide a
template that can be used for a longitudinal study to follow changes in forfeiture laws and
equitable sharing over time. A longitudinal study would provide a much larger sample
size and provide more robust results by minimizing the impact of outliers such as
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Virginia and West Virginia. This could be done in spite of the data limitations discussed
earlier because the data is readily available from the Department of Justice.
The limits of the data currently available at the state and federal level are a more
important issue than the relationship the statistical results indicate. The data available on
the use of asset forfeiture is woefully deficient and presents a large obstacle for both sides
of the forfeiture debate, including political scientists and policy makers. Official data at
the state level is lacking. Only 29 of the 50 states currently require law enforcement
agencies to keep track of their income from asset forfeiture (Williams et al. 2010:8).
Estimates taken from the LEMAS survey are estimates provided by law enforcement
officials and do not differentiate between money received from the federal government
via equitable sharing payments and those received from forfeiture actions in state court
(Worrall and Kovandzic 2008:232). The best and most reliable data comes from the
Department of Justice reports, data which is limited to those departments who receive
equitable sharing payments in a given year.
These data limitations make it difficult to measure the many ways in which
procedural requirements might affect the use of forfeiture by law enforcement at both the
aggregate and individual levels. A comprehensive nationwide evaluation of the use of
forfeiture and federal adoption by police is impossible at this point. And so while
proponents of asset forfeiture reform have some empirical evidence to support their
assertions, further empirical condemnation is difficult at this juncture. Similarly, these
limitations make it difficult for law enforcement to show evidence that asset forfeiture is
an effective crime control measure. There has yet to be a single study published that
shows a relationship between forfeiture activity and crime rate and the ongoing lack of
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data makes performing that research incredibly difficult (Worrall 2008: 13). Policy
makers are stuck between these two groups and until they decide to impose accounting
standards on law enforcement, answers will remain incomplete.
State asset forfeiture laws will need to be examined and evaluated individually
because of these data limitations. Additionally, the complexities of state laws and law
enforcement activity make statistical analysis difficult. State and department
geographical locations and criminal peculiarities may impact how asset forfeiture is
practiced. For example, a trailer where methamphetamine is manufactured may not be
worth having federal authorities seize but a house where marijuana is grown would be. A
state or department's location along one of the borders with Canada or Mexico or its
location along a transportation route for drugs would impact what kind of cases and what
kind of seizures they would make. State and regional case studies, such as Karis Ann
Yu-Chi's (2002) examination of forfeiture in California, offer the best path for examining
these influences and these variations between states and departments.
This approach would also be able to show how adoption of forfeiture cases has
changed the relationship between state and federal law enforcement officials. One of the
purported benefits of federal adoption is enhanced cooperation between federal and local
agencies (Asset Forfeiture Program 2008:50). It is important to distinguish whether or
not the cooperation between them is yielding reductions in crime and increased joint
investigative work or if cooperation is used by state law enforcement to get around state
judicial procedure and revenue distribution laws. This is an important relationship that
needs to be explored to fully evaluate asset forfeiture, federal adoption and their impact
on law enforcement.
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This is a particularly prudent track of research for policy makers who are
concerned that law enforcement may be evading state legislation and who are troubled by
the federal usurpation of state law enforcement functions and activities. Action can be
taken at either the state or federal level that may deter the use of federal adoption for
these purposes. Two states have implemented reform packages intended to limit the use
of federal adoption. Oregon and Utah both passed amendments to their state
constitutions to provide additional oversight of adoption and both amendments withstood
legal challenges within their states (Edgeworth 2008:224). State law makers could place
similar restrictions on law enforcement to ensure that asset forfeiture money is being
placed where they want it to be, especially when forfeiture is the result of a wholly local
investigation.
Likely the most effective action to deter the use of adoption to bypass state law
would be taken at the federal level. Federal guidelines could be amended to include a
provision that was stripped from previous forfeiture reform bills (Nelson 1992: 1330-
133 1). The provision was similar to those implemented by Oregon and Utah to require
equitable sharing payments be distributed according to state guidelines. This would
eliminate any financial incentive for law enforcement to circumvent state distribution
laws.
Additionally, adoptions could be limited to cases that have resulted in criminal
convictions in state court or to investigations where the adopting agency has been an
active participant. These two steps would remove the procedural incentives for state and
local law enforcement to use the federal court system on wholly local cases and ensure
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that only cases of federal jurisdiction are tried in federal court. This would also foster




The modern incarnation of asset forfeiture has been subject to fierce criticism
since its inception. It has been attacked as a criminal punishment masquerading as a civil
procedure (Jensen and Gerber 1992:429), for making an end-run around Due Process
protections of the constitution (Stahl 1992), for encouraging policing-for-profit
(Blumenson and Nilsen 1998) and for allowing law enforcement to circumvent restrictive
state laws (Ann-Yu Chi 2002). Scandals such as those in Texas and Minnesota have
surfaced and spurred further criticism from academics and policy makers alike.
Regardless of its negative image however, it has also been shown to be an increasingly
important part of law enforcement budgets and is a widely used tool in the fight against
financially motivated crime (Worrall 2001).
A large part of the debate comes down to legal arguments about what constitutes
criminal punishment and whether or not taking a person's property ostensibly for
committing a crime can be justified without that person ever being charged with or
convicted of a crime. Even if the data did not support the suppositions of critics, the
states would still have to consider the societal cost of having a system where people can
be punished without being convicted of a crime. The United States' Constitution
explicitly states that no one can be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law". It does not make a distinction between the three rights or suggest that
due process is more or less important to one or the other.
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Civil in rem forfeiture is a perversion of this constitutional doctrine. Arguments
for civil forfeiture are built on a morass of legalistic amorality. The Supreme Court has
ruled time and again that the practice is constitutionally admissible because the object is
treated as the offender. As Justice McKenna wrote in J. W. Goldsmith, Congress
essentially confers upon property "a power of complicity and guilt", a conceit that
ignores the culpability of the property owner. The guilt of an object is predicated on the
guilt of the person controlling the object. Treating an object as an offender and finding it
guilty of a crime without regard to the guilt of the person is an illogical reversal of how
crime is committed.
This concept grasps the root of Fellman's (1945) concern for constitutional
morality. The stated goal of asset forfeiture is to remove the economic incentives of
crime. It is meant as a deterrent and a punishment for criminals. The in rem
classification, which allows cases to be filed against property instead of the owner, is an
acknowledged legal fiction. Yet constitutionality of the practice rests on a feat of logical
ignorance that allows these aspects to be discarded simply because of the use of in rem
jurisdiction. Property owners are denied the basic constitutional rights afforded to
criminal defendants and are sanctioned for crimes that they are never found guilty of
because the state has decided that property can be punished instead, a feat comparable to
"build[ing] electricity plants under the guise of improving navigation" (Fellman
1945:23).
The notion that forfeiture is necessary in the fight against crime should not be
accepted as valid without evidence, especially when the existing empirical record
supports forfeiture skeptics. Law enforcement in Minnesota opposed proposals to reform
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the state's forfeiture law in the wake of the Metro Gang Strike Force scandal because of
its value to law enforcement. The executive director of the Minnesota Police and Peace
Officers argued that forfeiture was valuable in the fight against gangs and drug dealers
which is where it is "used the most and is the most effective" (Demko 2010). This
argument is advanced despite the dearth of evidence regarding the effect of forfeiture on
crime (Worrall 2008:13).
Research has so far found a significant number of law enforcement agencies
dependent on forfeiture as a budgetary device (Worrall 2001). Law enforcement
agencies have been found to use federal adoption to maximize their income from
forfeiture and avoid state income distribution laws (Worrall and Kovandzic 2008) and
previous research, as well as the results here, suggests that federal adoption may also be
used to circumvent procedural protections for property owners offered by state
legislatures and courts (Williams et al. 2010). This evidence, along with the many
scandals surrounding forfeiture, should not be dismissed in favor of unproven claims
made by law enforcement officials.
Forfeiture is not just a tool against crime. It is a chimera encompassing a number
of important issues. From property and due process rights to the undermining of state
and local legal authority, it is a power that deserves far more scrutiny than it currently
receives. Oversight and accounting are sorely lacking despite ongoing concerns over
abuse and law enforcement's dependence on the revenue generated by it. These
concerns, when considered in light of the empirical record and ongoing scandals, provide
ample evidence to cast doubt on the constitutional validity of in rem forfeiture and its
value as a tool against crime.
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APPENDIX A
DATA NOTES ON VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA
Equitable sharing rates for these two states were calculated using the median
value for equitable sharing payments made to the states between 2000 and 2008. This
was done because of the unusually high payments received by these states in the year this
study focuses on. This was due to a very unusual application of forfeiture in a very
unique case. The Purdue Pharma case, which resulted in a deposit of over $270 million
in the federal government's asset forfeiture fund, was not a typical forfeiture case. It
involved the marketing of a prescription drug, not the sale, manufacture or trafficking of
an illicit drug or the illicit sale of a legal drug.
The amount that West Virginia received from the case dwarfed previous equitable
sharing payments made to the state and in no way represented a typical year in payments
from the fund. The payments made to Virginia from the case were not as dramatically
different from previous years, but were still highly unusual and were not reflective of
their usual income from the program. Dropping the states because of their outlier status
would not have been recommended because of the already small size of the data set and
the potential for unrepresentative results. Dropping only West Virginia could not be
considered because the two states, despite the differences, were both tied to this one
extraordinary case. It may have been closer in real terms to Virginia's normal income
from equitable sharing, but was still quite anomalous.
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The median value was chosen as a replacement value because both states averages
were thrown off by the large payments in 2007 and 2008. The medians for both states
were the most representative of the central tendencies of the available data and best
represented what a typical year's income would be. Below is the raw data for the median
calculation in the form of payments to the states between 2000 and 2008.
Virginia 2008 $26,673,908.00 West Virginia 2008 $20,764,145.00
2007 $29,647,752.00 2007 $24,636,120.00
2006 $4,948,114.00 2006 $485,430.00
2005 $4,069,042.00 2005 $444,318.00
2004 $4,268,111.00 2004 $485,771.00
2003 $2,928,349.00 2003 $733,707.00
2002 $2,638,756.00 2002 $571,932.00
2001 $2,639,465.00 2001 $386,402.00
2000 $4,147,130.00 2000 $1,044,905.00
Average $9,106,736.33 Average $5,505,858.89
Median $4,147,130.00 Median $571,932.00




INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES
STATES Names of the 50 United States in alphabetical order. The
territories and the District of Columbia have been omitted.
STANDARD The burden of proof required to be met in state civil forfeiture
proceedings. For states which use multiple burdens of proof, the
lower burden is used. States that use probable cause are coded as
1, states that use preponderance of the evidence are coded as 2,
states that use clear and convincing evidence are coded as 3 and
states that use beyond a reasonable doubt are coded as 4. Nebraska
and North Carolina only allow criminal forfeiture and so are coded
4 for beyond a reasonable doubt based on the required burden for a
criminal conviction. Coding for all states is based on burden of
proof table in Edgeworth (2008).
CONVICTION Criminal conviction requirement. States that require a criminal
conviction in some instances before forfeiture proceedings can take
place are coded as 1, states that do not require a conviction are
coded as 0. Nebraska and North Carolina only allow criminal
forfeiture and so are coded 1 due to a conviction being required for
criminal forfeiture to take place. Based on Edgewroth (2010)
REVENUE How much a law enforcement agency can receive according to
state distribution law. States where seizing agency can receive
80% or more of forfeitures are coded 1 and includes states where
money is divided between agencies depending on contribution.
States where the seizing agency can only receive less than 80% are
coded as 0. Money must go directly to the seizing agency or their
controlling board, not a general law enforcement fund.
SHARING Rate of equitable sharing payments per 10,000 people. State
equitable sharing data from 2008 is divided by population
estimates for 2008 from the Census Bureau. This number is
multiplied by 10,000 to obtain a standardized rate of equitable
sharing.
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POVERTY Census Bureau poverty rate estimates by state for 2008
DRUG ARREST Drug arrest calculated for 2008. Total drug arrests taken from the
Department of Justice's Uniform Crime Report for 2008 are
divided by population estimates for 2008 from the Census Bureau























































































































































































































































































































































































STANDARD CONVICTION REVENUE POVERTY
DRUG
ARREST
SHARING
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
NewHampshire
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
15.9
9.2
14.7
17.3
13.3
11.2
9.1
10.3
13.3
14.7
9.3
12.5
12.2
12.9
11.4
11.3
17.3
17.6
12.6
8.2
10.1
14.4
9.6
20.8
13.5
14.1
10.8
11.2
7.8
35.37
25
52.68
40.32
73.12
36.14
46.07
67.52
87.25
35.82
15.7
36.19
35.35
35.55
28.3
24.46
18.63
40.72
43.89
101.69
30.51
31.76
34.86
39.95
60.88
16.75
58.49
57.25
24.82
13944.3
8192.14
9233.11
9041.06
14065.28
8527.16
5400.71
9317.05
18658.65
16393.61
12623.92
1150.74
10666.2
6777.7
5252.59
10257.31
13739.89
6285.75
2625.98
14293.33
8078.83
13267.91
4667.97
9176.61
17696.98
4005.43
27638.86
15293.66
8151.98
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New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennesee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
2
3
2
4
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
3
3
2
1
2
4
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
8.7
17
13.7
14.6
11.5
13.3
15.7
13.5
12.1
12.1
15.7
12.7
15.5
15.8
9.7
10.4
10.2
11.3
17.4
10.5
9.5
60.75
30.81
27.16
39.65
27.58
26.62
56.41
44.12
45.17
36.08
40.68
29.78
55.81
56.27
33.77
18.3
41.85
35.79
23.42
44.55
55.74
6874.75
16541.03
20200.18
19479.19
1265.38
10800.2
7081.9
2703.82
6566.24
15070.6
10628.5
84.36
10010.05
12148.01
5572.31
16029.28
5337.99
3816.98
3152.06
6647.99
2124.7
67
